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ASSIGNMENT: A SKEPTICAL LOOK
AT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
RICHARD DELGADO*
INTRODUCTION: IN WHICH RODRIGO ENCOUNTERS ME
IN AN EMBARRASSING SITUATION AND I LEARN
ABOUT HIS UNUSUAL COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENT
I was sitting glumly on the cold, hard bench in the long marble hall of
the city courthouse when a familiar voice shook me from my reverie:
"Professor! What are you doing here?"
"Rodrigo," I stammered, rising and awkwardly shaking the hand of
my young friend and proteg6.I "I might say the same. You're the last per-
* Jean Lindsley Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. J.D., 1974, Boalt
Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
1. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, 101 YALE L.J. 1357 (1992) [hereinafter Del-
gado, Chronicle] (introducing my interlocutor and alter ego, Rodrigo). The son of an African-
American serviceman and Italian mother, Rodrigo was born in the United States but raised in Italy
when his father was assigned to a U.S. outpost there. Rodrigo graduated from the base high school,
then attended an Italian university and law school on government scholarships, graduating second in
his class. When the reader meets him, he has returned to the United States to investigate graduate law
(LL.M.) programs. At the suggestion of his sister, veteran U.S. civil rights lawyer Geneva Crenshaw,
he seeks out "the professor" for advice, see DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE
QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987). Despite their age difference, the two become good friends, dis-
cussing affirmative action and the decline of the West, see Delgado, Chronicle, supra; law and eco-
nomics, see Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Second Chronicle: The Economics and Politics of Race, 91
MICH. L. REv. 1183 (1993); love, see Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Third Chronicle: Care, Competi-
tion, and the Redemptive Tragedy of Race, 81 CAL. L. REV. 387 (1993); legal rules, see Richard Del-
gado, Rodrigo's Fourth Chronicle: Neutrality and Stasis in Antidiscrimination Law, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1133 (1993); the critique of normativity, see Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifth Chronicle: Civitas,
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son I expected to see here. I'm waiting for my lawyer. What about you?
Are you here to represent a client?"
Rodrigo laughed, then said, "No, I'm here for a meeting in the cham-
bers of the chief judge. It's for a state bar committee that the dean volun-
teered me for." Looking up at the sign overhead that said CRIMINAL
DIVISION, Rodrigo added incredulously, "You aren't being charged with
something, are you?"
"I'm sorry to say I am," I said, hanging my head. "For the first time
in my life. I haven't even had a parking ticket in twenty years, and now
this."
2
"What did you do-I mean, allegedly?" Rodrigo asked.
I sighed. "It's a long story." Rodrigo gestured that he wanted to hear,
so I went on. "I was crossing the street in front of the law school in the
company of a brilliant student named Raul, who was having a crisis of
conscience. A Puerto Rican, he had come to my office to talk about drop-
Civil Wrongs, and the Politics of Denial, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1581 (1993); relations between men and
women of color, see Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Sixth Chronicle: Intersections, Essences, and the
Dilemma of Social Reform, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 639 (1993); enlightenment political theory, see Richard
Delgado, Rodrigo's Seventh Chronicle: Race, Democracy, and the State, 41 UCLA L. REV. 721
(1994); black crime, see Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eighth Chronicle: Black Crime, White Fears -
On the Social Construction of Threat, 80 VA. L. REV. 503 (1994) [hereinafter Delgado, Black Crime];
narrative jurisprudence, see Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Final Chronicle: Cultural Power, the Law
Reviews, and the Attack on Narrative Jurisprudence, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 545 (1995) (final chronicle
in the first cycle and final chapter of RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES (1995)); the rule
of law, see Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Ninth Chronicle: Race, Legal Instrumentalism, and the Rule
of Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 379 (1994) [hereinafter Delgado, Race, Instrumentalism]; affirmative ac-
tion, see Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affirmative Action, 83 GEO. L.J.
1711 (1995); clinical theory, see Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eleventh Chronicle: Empathy and False
Empathy, 84 CAL. L. REV. 61 (1996) [hereinafter Delgado, Empathy]; the problem of desperately poor
border settlements, see Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Twelfth Chronicle: The Problem of the Shanty, 85
GEO. L.J. 667 (1997); formalism, see Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Thirteenth Chronicle: Legal For-
malism and Law's Discontents, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1105 (1997) [hereinafter Delgado, Formalism]; the
recent right-wing surge, see Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fourteenth Chronicle: American Apoca-
lypse, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 275 (1997); racial mixture and assimilation, see Richard Delgado,
Rodrigo's Fifteenth Chronicle: Racial Mixture, Latino Critical Scholarship and the Black-White Bi-
nary, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1181 (1997); alternative dispute resolution, see Richard Delgado, Conflict as
Pathology: An Essay for Trina Grillo, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1391 (1997) (unnumbered tribute to the late
Professor Grillo); and human cloning, see RICHARD DELGADO, WHEN EQUALITY ENDS: STORIES
ABOUT RACE AND RESISTANCE, ch. 6, "Rodrigo's Chromosomes" (forthcoming 1999) [hereinafter
DELGADO, CHROMOSOMES]. During this period, the brash, talented Rodrigo earns his LL.M. degree
and embarks on his first teaching position. The professor meets his friend and soul mate "Giannina,"
and learns that Rodrigo's family immigrated to America via the Caribbean. His father, Lorenzo, looks
black and identifies as such, but speaks perfect Spanish.
2. Like Giannina and Rodrigo, the professor is an imaginary character and not to be confused
with any person, living or dead. As I have created him, the professor is a civil rights scholar of color
in the late stages of his career. See Delgado, Chronicle, supra note I (introducing the professor).
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ping out of school in order to fight shoulder to shoulder, as he put it, with
his brothers and sisters in the barrio. He said he couldn't see spending two
more years studying cases about giant corporations and insurance compa-
nies when his people needed him now."3
Rodrigo nodded sympathetically. "I had a student with a similar la-
ment just last week. And then what happened?"
"Everything happened so fast I'm not really sure. We stepped into
the street, I heard a screech, and a bicyclist from a messenger service went
flying. He suffered nothing worse than a cut knee and a tom pant leg, but
a police officer, who must have been practically on the spot, cited us for
reckless endangerment."
"That's a class three felony," Rodrigo said, suddenly serious. "Was
the light in your favor?"
"I honestly can't recall, although I've crossed that street hundreds of
times, and always look. I assume the 'WALK' sign was on. But the mes-
senger swears it wasn't and that we cut him off."
"They're really throwing the book at you," Rodrigo said. "I would
have thought that for a first offense they'd let someone like you off with a
jaywalking ticket and a warning. Maybe make you pay for the messen-
ger's pants and band-aid."
"I would have thought so, too," I said. "I forgot to tell you Raul has
long hair, and was wearing a red bandanna around his forehead and carry-
ing a boom box."
"I can't believe it," Rodrigo said, clapping his hand to his forehead.
"Professor, they're charging you with TNB."
"That's what my lawyer thinks, too," I said. "'Typical nigger behav-
ior,' in the cynical police phrase.4 The mayor's been on a campaign to
3. For a discussion on the advisability of modifying legal pedagogy and the law school envi-
ronment so as to make them more accessible and relevant to students of color, women, and those in-
terested in pursuing public interest careers, see, e.g., LOUISE HARMON & DEBORAH WAIRE POST,
CULTIVATING INTELLIGENCE (1996); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 389-430 (Richard
Delgado ed., 1995) [hereinafter CUTrING EDGE]; Delgado, Formalism, supra note I (discussing the
law's discontents in general).
4. This and similar code words and epithets have been used in police communications. See
Interview with "B," Anonymous Police Officer in a Major U.S. City (1998) (on file with author);
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONERS ON THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 71-73
(1991) ("Warren Christopher Commission") (discussing the use of such terms as "Guerillas in the
Mist," "the natives," "monkeys slapping time," "huntin' wabbits," "Don't cry Buckwheat," "cholo,"
and "don't transfer me any orientals"); MARVIN ZALMAN & LARRY J. SIEGEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
CONSTITUTION AND SOCIETY 332 (1984) (noting that a group of officers in an Ohio department had
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crack down, not just against jaywalking and loud radios, but any manifes-
tation of black disorderliness or cultural self-assertion. It's a misguided
application of James Q. Wilson's broken-windows theory."5
"What were you wearing?"
"A business suit. But I'd taken off my tie and left it in my office,
probably out of a misguided subconscious desire to show solidarity with
Raul."
"And now they're charging you, who has led an exemplary life and is
a model of civic responsibility," Rodrigo said. "I still can't believe it.
What are you facing?"
"Oh, maybe a week in the city jail, followed by community service of
some sort-probably a traffic guard in front of a school. The community
service I don't mind. The jail time I could do without. The law school
would have to get someone to cover my classes."
"Has the dean done anything?"
"She wrote a strong letter to the prosecutor and the chief judge, all to
no avail. And, can you believe it, the district attorney assigned to prose-
cute me turns out to be one of my own ex-students. She seemed a little
sheepish at the plea bargaining conference, but refused to drop or lower the
charge. My lawyer thinks her whole office is on a tough-on-crime binge
and wants to make an example of me."
6
"What do you know about the judge?" Rodrigo asked.
"We drew Judge Ingersol."
designated themselves a "special nigger arrest team"-SNAT). See also PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF
THE KNIFE: POLICE VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAS (1995) (discussing police violence in general); JOHiN
P. CRANK, UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC CULTURE 123, 206-15 (1998); JEROME SKOLNICK, JUSTICE
WITHOUT TRIAL 41-68 (3d ed. 1994) (discussing racism and prejudice in police work). On race profil-
ing, in which police use an individual's race to decide whether to stop and question him, see Harvey
A. Silverglate, 'Race Profiling' Inflicts Injustice on Individuals, NAT'L L.J., June 22, 1998, at A-20.
On stereotyping, rude treatment, and police harassment of black males, see D. Marvin Jones, "We're
All Stuck Here for a While": Law and the Social Construction of the Black Male, 24 J. CONTEMP. L.
35 (1998). See also Delgado, Black Crime, supra note I (on social construction of black crime as
threat).
5. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Keiling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood
Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29 (hypothesizing that blight encourages criminals to
move in).
6. Compare the professor's plight with John Kifner, Thousands Call on City Hall to Confront
Police Brutality, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1997, at A-I (detailing New York City Mayor Rudolph Giul-




"Oh, no! Isn't he the one who... "
"The very one," I said. "Last year he let a burglar with an otherwise
clean record off on bail, and the burglar committed a double rape. The
right wing got up a petition to have the judge impeached, and when that
failed, launched a campaign to recall him."7
"And ever since then, I bet, he's been tough on crime and criminals,"
Rodrigo said, completing my thought.
"Maximum sentences on everything, and no bail, ever. Oh, here's my
lawyer."
Rodrigo stood while I introduced him to Jerome Steinglass, another
ex-student and former prosecutor who knew the court system well. After a
few pleasantries, my lawyer said, "We've been continued, I'm afraid, until
the afternoon session. The court clerk just told me." When I must have
grimaced, he added, "But she promised to get us on first thing. Why don't
we meet right here at quarter of one?"
I looked at my watch. "I guess it can't be helped. Would either of
you like to join me for lunch in the cafeteria downstairs?"
My lawyer demurred, but Rodrigo said, "Sure. My meeting's not for
an hour. I was just going to take in a session or two of your judge's court,
actually. But I'd much rather talk with you."
Steinglass disappeared with a wave, and minutes later Rodrigo and I
were walking through the line of the cavernous cafeteria in the basement
of the court building, examining the food. "What are you having?" I
asked.
"These scallops look good," Rodrigo said, helping himself to a big
ladle full. "How about you?"
"A club sandwich, I think. I don't usually eat meat, but I feel a need
to gear myself up for my ordeal."
"I'm sure it won't be as bad as you think," Rodrigo said, as the cash-
ier punched in the numbers for his food. "The mayor's office would look
pretty silly if his get-tough policy locked up a famous, elderly law profes-
sor for jaywalking." He handed the cashier his credit card, then said, "I'll
7. See John C. Yoo, Criticizing Judges, 1 GREEN BAG 2d, 277, 277-81 (1998) (discussing
various recent efforts to impeach and chastise judges). See also infra note 10 and accompanying text
(discussing efforts to recall judges, such as Penny White of Tennessee, who angered conservatives by
her rulings in cases of unpopular litigants).
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be glad to serve as a character witness, if you like. It'd be my privilege,
and I'll be just down the hall if you need me."
"Thanks," I said. "I'll tell my lawyer. Although it's sort of a role re-
versal."
"Right," Rodrigo said with a quick smile. "It wasn't too long ago that
you were writing letters of recommendation for me.8 Life is funny."
"That it is," I admitted, following him out the line. "Now tell me
about that committee of yours."
I. IN WHICH RODRIGO TRIES TO PERSUADE ME THAT THE
CONTROVERSY OVER JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
CONTAINS MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE
"Is this table okay?" Rodrigo asked. When I nodded, he set down his
tray, then pulled out the chair for me to sit. I remarked once again his
courtesy toward my aging frailties-I hadn't had someone pull out my
chair for some time. His European background came out at the oddest
times, I thought. After setting down my own plates and handing my tray
to a passing waiter, I settled back while Rodrigo began telling me about
the committee.
"The association just set up this committee, which consists of several
lawyers, myself and one other law professor, and the chief judge of this
court.9 The association had been considering doing so for some time, be-
cause of the hue and cry over judicial activism and soft-on-crime, liberal
judges, mainly by conservative pressure groups, 10 and corresponding con-
cerns by progressives, mainstream lawyers, and citizens about the judici-
ary's independence." 
11
8. See Delgado, Chronicle, supra note I (Professor discusses the pros and cons of various
LL.M. programs on the young man's return to the States).
9. Compare Rodrigo's committee with the national version, which issued a major report re-
cently. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, COMMISSION ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL IN.
DEPENDENCE, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY (1997) [hereinafter ABA].
10. See id. at 46; Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done
Amid Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 308, 313 (1997). For a discussion on judicial independence generally, see Federal Judicial hI-
dependence Symposium, 46 MERCER L. REV. 637 (1995); Judith S. Kaye, Safeguarding a Crown
Jewel: Judicial Independence and Lawyer Criticism of Courts, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 703 (1997). See
also House Passes "Judicial Activism" Bill, THE THIRD BRANCH, May 1998, at I [hereinafter Activ-
ism] (describing measure backed by "the right wing" to curb judicial initiative and discourage prisoner
suits).
11. See ABA, supra note 9, at 5-6, 19, 22-23, 49; Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984
Term-Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4, 32 (1985) [hereinafter Bell, Civil
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"Hmm," said Rodrigo, taking a bite full of his steaming food. "Not
bad for a cafeteria. I guess I'm hungry. I walked all the way over from the
hotel. How's your club?"
"Great," I said, swallowing and putting the sandwich down on my
plate. "I must confess I miss meat, even after more than a year. Oh, what
we do on doctors' orders. But go on."
"As you might have guessed, the culminating event was the write-in
campaign to get rid of Judge Ingersol."
"Whom I'll be meeting in"-I looked at my watch-"fifty-five min-
utes. But I gather things were building even before that."
"They were," Rodrigo replied. "Everyone remembers what happened
when Roosevelt threatened to pack the Supreme Court, which was bent on
invalidating New Deal legislation, and those early efforts to impeach
judges, often initiated by politicians eager to discredit a judicial appointee
of the opposing party. The first impeachment of a federal judge took place
in 1804 when the Federalists brought charges against the 'alcoholic and
deranged' John Pickering. The very next year, the Jeffersonians responded
by unsuccessfully attempting to impeach Supreme Court Justice Samuel
Chase in highly publicized hearings."'
12
"But that kind of politics went on years ago. Surely, judges today
cannot be impeached purely for political reasons," I responded.
"That's debatable," Rodrigo replied. "Seven federal judges have been
impeached and convicted in U.S. history, three as recently as the 1980s.
Several of those trials featured flimsy evidence and dubious circum-
stances."
' 13
Rights Chronicles]. The main concern today comes from moderate left or progressive observers who
fear that the well-organized political right is getting the upper hand by browbeating judges and whip-
ping up the public.
12. See MARY L. VOLCANSEK, JUDICIAL IMPEACHMENT 6 (1993). While Chase was indicted by
the House on charges that he treated defendants who violated the Alien and Sedition Acts leniently,
the Senate acquitted him and Chase continued to serve on the highest court until his death in 1811.
See id. The Constitution mentions impeachment six times. Article 1, section 2 provides that the
House bring impeachment charges, while the next section gives the Senate the power actually to try
the case. See id. at 5.
13. The three federal judges impeached and convicted by the Senate during the 1980s were
Judge Harry Eugene Claiborne (U.S. District Judge, Nevada), Judge Alcee Lamar Hastings (U.S. Dis-
trict Judge, Florida), and Judge Walter L. Nixon (U.S. District Judge, Southern Mississippi). See id. at
8. See also ABA, supra note 9, at 47-48. For a discussion of state impeachment, see Jerome B.
Meites & Steven F. Pflaum, Justice James D. Heiple: Impeachment and the Assault on Judicial Inde-
pendence, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 741 (1998).
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"I remember hearing something about a judge in Nevada who was
impeached even though the state bar association found he was a victim of a
federal vendetta,"'14 I said, checking my watch.
"Judges face immense pressure to appear tough on crime--or low on
activism.15 When they stray, they feel the heat," Rodrigo said. "Even
lawyers with immaculate records, who have dedicated their professional
lives to fighting racism and discrimination, face an uphill battle for posi-
tions in government. Look at the example of Bill Lann Lee. Just last year,
Republicans blocked his appointment as Assistant Attorney General.
16
Don't worry. I can see the clock," Rodrigo indicated. "I won't let you be
late."
"I'm sure Steinglass would come get me in the unlikely event we lost
track of the time," I said. "Go on."
"Well, much of the concern today stems from pressure groups, as I
mentioned. But others worry about lawyers who criticize judges for the
way they rule or handle a case. They think it's undignified and demeans
the judiciary in the public's eyes.' 7 A few deplore mandatory sentencing
or urge that we get away from requiring judges to stand for re-election, as
some states do. 18  They think the process is too politicized and causes
judges to decide cases with an eye on how they will look to the electorate.
Recently, the national association got up in arms when President Clinton
threatened to call for the dismissal of a federal judge who freed a defen-
dant charged with drug-running because of an illegal search and seizure." 19
14. Harry Eugene Claibome, a maverick judge who mistrusted government, had jousted with
the federal government and various agencies several times in the past. Claibome maintained he was
targeted by government officials and that the ensuing bribery charges were entirely founded upon the
word of a convicted felon protecting his own interests. Even after his impeachment by the Senate, the
Nevada Bar Association found that Claiborne was a victim of a "federal vendetta." See VOLCANSEK,
supra note 12, at 24, 63.
15. See Mario Cuomo, Some Thoughts on Judicial Independence, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 298, 299-
302 (1997); ABA, supra note 9, at 22-23, 49; Yoo, supra note 7, at 279-82. For a discussion of a
campaign to punish federal judge Harold Baer for suppressing illegally seized evidence in a drug case,
see Bright, supra note 10, at 324, 326-27; ABA, supra note 9, at 5-6, 15-18 (describing this and simi-
lar cases ofjudges hounded because of unpopular decisions); Activism, supra note 10.
16. See John M. Broder, Clinton, Softening Slap at Senate, Names 'Acting' Civil Rights Chief,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1997, at A-1.
17. See Monroe Freedman, The Threat to Judicial Independence by Criticism of Judges: A Pro-
posed Solution to the Real Problem, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 729 (1997); Hal R. Liebman, Should Law-
yers be Free to Publicly Excoriate Judges?, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 785, 791-95 (1997).
18. See Bright, supra note 10, at 308; ABA, supra note 9, at 38-39, 63; Cuomo, supra note 15,
at 302-03; Leslie W. Abrahamson, The Judge's Ethical Duty to Report Misconduct by Other Judges,
Lawyers, and Its Effects on Judicial Independence, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 751, 791-95 (1997) (noting
that running for re-election is becoming increasingly demanding and costly).
19. See ABA, supra note 9, at 15.
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"I've seen editorials in the ABA journal deploring that sort of
thing," 20 I said, then added, squaring my shoulders, "As well they should."
"And you probably know that the association commissioned a study
group to look into the issue. It released its report, reiterating the value of
judicial independence, just year before last.,
21
When Rodrigo paused, I said, "And what's your role in all this? I
hope you're not against judicial independence."
"Well, as I mentioned, the dean nominated me. And I'm afraid I am
supposed to present the critical, or skeptical view, whatever that is."
"A daunting assignment!" I exclaimed. "On two counts. First, I can't
remember a single article by a leading crit on the subject. It's like writing
against motherhood or apple pie. But more fundamentally, I don't see how
anyone can be against judicial independence, even a race-crit like you.
Need I remind you that I'm facing jail merely because of one of those
right-wing campaigns that the judicial-independence movement is aimed at
countering? I'm afraid I'm going to be a very hard sell. But go on-
what's your flaky, out-of-touch, radical critique of this liberal legalism?"
II. IN WHICH RODRIGO PRESENTS EIGHT DOUBTS
ABOUT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
"I decided there isn't just one perspective," Rodrigo began, pushing
his plate away to give himself more room. "Ranging from the neoliberal
view which would highlight a few reservations, to the deeply distrust-
ful .... "
"All the way to the legitimizing myth, I imagine," I added.
"Exactly," Rodrigo seconded. "I've actually made a list." Looking
down at a piece of paper he pulled from his pocket, he said, "I've identi-
fied eight separate critiques."
When Rodrigo looked up, I said, "This better be good. Especially as
I'm likely to end up an unwitting victim of the whole hysterical right-wing
20. See Jerome J. Shestack, The Risks to Judicial Independence, A.B.A. J., June 1998, at 8;
What Is Judicial Independence?: Views from the Public, the Press, the Profession, and the Politicians
- An Edited Transcript of a Panel Discussion at the American Judicature Society's 1996 Annual
Meeting, 80 JUDICATURE 73 (1996). See also Archibald Cox, The Independence of the Judiciary:
History and Purpose, 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 565 (1996).
21. See ABA, supra note 9 (decrying politicization and harsh criticism of judges and the judg-
ing functions, and suggesting measures to cope with them).
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surge. My own prot6g6, trying to put me in jail," I groused, then smiled to
let Rodrigo know I was joking.
"Oh, Professor, nothing's going to happen to you," Rodrigo replied.
"I'd bet a fine, at worst, and a few weekends of community service. You'd
look dashing in a school crossing guard uniform."
"My students will be highly amused."
"You can use the experience in class," Rodrigo smiled. "Maybe in a
hypothetical about the reasonably prudent crossing guard."
"Cold comfort," I said. "Maybe I'll let you take my place. But let's
hear your arguments."
A. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AS A DEFLECTION
Rodrigo glanced down again at his list. "I didn't mean to make light
of your predicament. The first way to look at judicial independence is as a
deflection."
"Do you mean as a deflection from other issues that really matter, or
from other, more valid ways of looking at the judicial function?" I asked.
"Both. Consider the way the debate obscures how a host of forces
constrains judicial decisionmaking. Most judges are white, male, middle-
class, able-bodied, and moderate in their social and political views.22 No
one considers this an affront to judicial independence, although it has a
tremendous influence on how cases are decided. Judicial independence
enthusiasts take the judiciary, as currently constituted, and then spend a
great deal of time and indignation clearing the way for them to act as
freely as possible. It's a little like planting your garden with only one kind
of seed and then suing the supplier when the flowers come up slightly dif-
ferent in height because of variations in the soil or sunlight. Giannina
thought of the metaphor."
"I hope you're not saying that judicial independence is unimportant,"
I said. "I'm on trial before a basically good, honest judge. I know him
slightly-he was on our board of visitors. To use Giannina's metaphor, he
represents a good seed. If left alone, I'm confident he'd do justice. But
I'm worried, precisely because in trying me, he might be looking over his
shoulder at special interest groups that want to see me behind bars."
22. On the racial composition of the U.S. judiciary, see Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges:
Racial Diversity, Impartiality, and Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95 (1997).
[Vol. 72:425
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"I see your point," Rodrigo conceded. "Maybe we can say that judi-
cial independence, like all liberal legalisms, both advances and retards the
cause of justice.23 A mixed blessing, it can operate for good or for ill. The
good part is easily stated: When things work the way they're supposed to,
a fearless, wise judge exercises an independent mind in rendering justice.
And this, of course, actually happens on occasion. Brown v. Board of
Education24 comes to mind. But, that said, one immediately thinks of the
many cases when judges, completely without pressure, handed down cruel,
racist rulings simply because they didn't see them that way at the time.
25
Their class situation and range of experiences allowed them to do business
as usual. And 'as usual' meant radically unjust."
"Robert Cover wrote about that," I mused. 26 "Some crits, too.27 But
you mustn't overstate. Sometimes judicial independence can take your eye
off the ball. But other times, it keeps you focused on it exactly. What's
your next criticism?"
B. JUDGES AS PECULIAR OBJECTS OF MERCY
"I'll try not to. Overstate, I mean," Rodrigo said. "My next one isn't
so much a criticism as an observation. It's just that judges are, by and
large, anything but an oppressed class. Highly paid and educated, they
enjoy some of the highest occupational prestige of any profession.2 s Most
of them live in nice homes, send their children to good schools, and retire
as millionaires. They have good fringe benefits, medical coverage, and a
solvent pension system. Some of them have lifetime security.
29
"Like tenure in our line of work," I replied dryly.30
"Better," said Rodrigo. "They can't be removed, except for blatant
misconduct.31 And their salaries cannot be reduced while in office, as ours
23. See Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Delgado, Race, Instrumen-
talism, supra note 1.
24. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
25. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious
Moral Error?, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1929 (1991) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic, Norms]. See also
ROBERT COVER, JUsncE ACcUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975); Delgado, Em-
pathy, supra note 1.
26. See COVER, supra note 25.
27. See, e.g., Delgado & Stefancic, Norms, supra note 25.
28. See Yoo, supra note 7, at 277,281.
29. For example, federal judges' compensation may not be reduced while they are in office.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
30. Tenure brings job security, but no guarantee of further promotion or salary advance.
31. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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can under some systems of post-tenure review.32 No one is threatening to
bum down their churches or set crosses on fire on their lawns. The police
do not routinely harass them if they are caught walking or jogging in the
wrong neighborhood."33
"And your point, Rodrigo, is ... T'
"Oh, it's that dashing around, making a fetish of defending judges
against unkind words or the occasional removal from office, is an odd al-
location of resources. No one speaks of the need to protect the independ-
ence of dentists or accountants, for example, even though they do valuable
work, too, or waxes indignant over devices to control the jury-such as
voir dire,34 judgment n.o.v., 35 sequestration,36 gag orders,37 or jury in-
structions that run on dozens of pages and spell out in minute detail what
they are to do38 or ones that control lawyers. I'm thinking of judicial
chastisement, sarcasm, injunctions to 'move things along, counsel,' and
even contempt citations when a lawyer has done something a judge finds
offensive or obstructionist, even if the lawyer did it on principle.39 Nor
does anyone see an affront to judicial independence when a higher court
exercises its independence to slap down a lower one."40
"So, you think we're guilty of selective sympathy," I said.
"Something like that," Rodrigo replied. "I'm sure this argument
alone won't persuade you, especially because you want Judge Ingersol to
be independent when he hears your case. I just point it out to show how
32. See supra note 29.
33. See Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and
Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN L. REV. 781 (1994) (discussing statistical racism and hassling
black men because of their color); Delgado, Black Crime, supra note 1 (construction of blacks as dan-
gerous).
34. For a discussion of voir dire, see JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 522 (2d ed. 1993).
35. See id. at 553 (discussing judgment n.o.v.).
36. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & GERALD H. ISRAEL, 3 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 41 (1984)
(discussing jury sequestration).
37. See id. at 185 (discussing gag orders issued to avert jury contamination).
38. See id. at 464 (discussing the role of jury instructions in limiting that body's options).
39. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Scorn, 35 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 1061 (1994)
[hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic, Scorn].
40. See Jerome Farris, Judges on Judging: The Ninth Circuit-Most Maligned Circuit in the
Country-Fact or Fiction?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1465 (1997) (describing the recent pattern of reversals of
Ninth Circuit decisions); Editorial, Decency and the Arts, DENVER POST, June 27, 1998, at B9; David
G. Savage, 9th Circuit Rebuked Again, A.B.A. J., July 1998, at 40. See also Bob Egelko, Judge Ac-
cused of Misconduct for Writing Dissenting Opinion, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA, July 8, 1995, at B3
(liberal judge J. Anthony Kline accused of judicial misconduct by state commission for dissenting, on
grounds of conscience, from a 2-1 ruling concerning the erasure of past rulings in a case).
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it's easy to get caught up in a crusade on behalf of judges, when other ac-
tors may be equally deserving. Do you want to hear my next point?"
C. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, LIKE MANY LIBERAL RALLYING CRIES,
IS A PAIRED PLATITUDE
"I do," I replied. "I hope it's more impressive than your last one."
Rodrigo winced, then said, "I'll let you decide. Do you recall the
cls 4 1 position on indeterminacy?"
"Of course," I replied. "It holds that legal reasoning, especially of the
case-law variety, never, or almost never, dictates a single conclusion. 42 By
picking one argument or line of authority, the lawgiver can make one out-
come appear inevitable and just. By picking another, he or she can ra-
tionalize the opposite result. This open-textured quality, first pointed out
by the legal realists in the early part of the century, allows a wide scope for
politics and disguised personal predilection on the part of the decision-
maker. Cls refined this critique and applied it to a host of areas, including
torts,43 contracts,44 constitutional,4 5 and labor law."46
"And have you considered how the same thing may apply to policy
arguments?" Rodrigo asked.
"I suppose it could," I said. "There's the old joke about how you can
almost always find an opposite proverb for any situation. Look before you
leap. He who hesitates is lost. Birds of a feather flock together. Oppo-
sites attract. And so on."
"Well, consider how the rallying cry of judicial independence is set
off against other maxims that we also subscribe to and trot out from time
to time: judicial responsibility or accountability, 47 judicial restraint,48 law
41. Critical Legal Studies.
42. See David Kairys, Legal Reasoning, in THE POLmCs OF LAW 11 (David Kairys ed., 1982).
43. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law,
With Special References to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563
(1982).
44. See Peter Gabel & Jay M. Feinman, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE POLITICS OF LAW,
supra note 42, at 172.
45. See Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination
Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978).
46. See Karl E. Klare, Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law, in THE POLrTICS OF LAW, su-
pra note 42, at 65.
47. See Judge J. Clifford Wallace, Resolving Judicial Corruption While Preserving Judicial
Independence: Comparative Perspectives, 28 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 341, 341 (1998) (pointing out that
criticism of judges and demands for accountability are worldwide).
1999]
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
as the least dangerous branch,49 strict construction, 0 checks and bal-
ances,51 and the will of the people should not be lightly set aside."
52
"So you're saying that judicial independence is part of a matrix of
values that surround the judiciary and its functioning. When we want to
limit a judge's prerogative, we pick one of the narrowing kind. But when
we like what they're doing-such as when they intervene on behalf of dis-
crete and insular minorities53 -we forget these other maxims and genuflect
toward judicial independence. We praise judges for their courage in inter-
ceding on behalf of weak, impotent, voiceless groups."
54
"You put it better than I could have myself," Rodrigo said. "And in
that respect, judicial independence is like other vague, mushy, but noble-
sounding liberal legalisms, such as free speech. They conceal what is hap-
pening in the real world, diverting discussion of the content of what the
speaker is saying-whether progressive or regressive-into a procedural,
free-speech controversy: 'I've got my rights.' 55  By the same token, we
sometimes need to look at what judges are doing with their independence,
or what those advocating restraint are promoting. Chanting over and over
that judges should be free-or accountable, for that matter-obscures what
they are actually doing."
"Which can often be good," I pointed out.56
"Or bad," Rodrigo countered. "As when the Supreme Court back-
tracked from Brown v. Board of Education57 or cut back on affirmative
48. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (praising judicial self-restraint); Activism, supra note 10.
49. See BICKEL, supra note 48.
50. See Stanley C. Brubaker, Comment to Cox, 47 MD. L. REv. 162 (1987).
51. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (articu-
lating the theory of tripartite government in which each branch limits the other). See also TnE
FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465-66 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating courts are
the institution best able to enforce limitations on government); Activism, supra note 10.
52. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 653 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
53. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); LAURENCE TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTrITONAL LAW 14 (2d ed. 1988).
54. See ABA, supra note 9, at 6, 23; Activism, supra note 10 (suggesting that courts must fear-
lessly defend constitutional rights). But see BELL, supra note 1 (pointing out that when the celebra-
tion stops, hard won gains are apt to quietly slip away); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, The Social
Construction of Brown v. Board of Education: Law Reform and the Reconstructive Paradox, 36 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 547 (1995) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic, Social Construction].
55. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (discussing a case of cross-burning al-
most exclusively in procedural and free speech terms).
56. I thought of cases in which the Court has expanded the rights of school children, see Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); gays, see Romer, 517 U.S. 620; African Americans, see Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); and women, see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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action,58 search and seizure law, 59 liability of police who engage in high-
speed chases, 60 and the right to abortion.61 Not to mention your own
case."
"Which would have come out fine without those pressure groups
looking over the shoulders of good judges. No, Rodrigo, I'm afraid you
haven't converted me, at least not yet. Let's hear your other arguments."
D. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AS A CHECK AND BALANCE
"My next one," Rodrigo said, looking down at his list, "is not so
much an argument against judicial independence as an observation about
its place in our political system. Do you remember how we were saying
that platitudes come in pairs?"62 I nodded yes-after all, it had been only
ten minutes ago-these youngsters must think we old-timers have no
faculty of memory left at all, I thought. "Well," Rodrigo went on, "at least
one of those platitudes has a broad, political dimension. I'm sure you've
heard how our system is one of checks and balances?" 63
"Of course," I said. "Federalist Ten sets out the theory.64 To reduce
the risk of tyranny, the three branches are created coequal, each limiting
the power of the other. And, to me at least, this is not only a very good
thing, but an excellent reason for an independent judiciary. Who else
could rein in an out-of-control Congress or curb a president bent on skull-
duggery, as with Nixon during the Watergate crisis?
65
"But notice two things," Rodrigo said. "First, that both sides invoke
checks and balances with equal conviction. Conservatives say we need to
be able to vote judges out of office, precisely because they consider this a
57. 349 U.S. 294,301 (1955) ("Brown II," ordering desegregation of Southern schools "with all
deliberate speed"). See also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (rejecting metropolitan-wide
remedy for segregated schools).
58. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
59. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)
(good faith defense to an otherwise illegal, warrantless search).
60. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S.Ct. 1708 (1998).
61. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
62. See supra notes 42-55 and accompanying text.
63. See TRIBE, supra note 53, at 18-19; ABA, supra note 9, at 5.
64. See supra note 51.
65. See generally CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (1974)
(discussing this sorry chapter in recent U.S. history). See also Stephen Breyer, Judicial Independence
in the United States, 40 ST. LOUIs U. L.J. 989, 996 (1996) (attributing a similar view to early theorists
of U.S. government, including George Washington).
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vital check on an out-of-control judiciary that is unresponsive to the will of
the people."
66
"While liberals say the opposite, namely that these pressure groups
are diminishing the ability of judges to serve as an independent check on
the behavior of other branches, such as the police," I added.67
"A perfect stand-off," Rodrigo said. "Both sides invoke the same
value, certain the other is wrong in hijacking it to support its position."
I paused, then said, "On this one, Rodrigo, I agree with you. The
checks-and-balances notion is too abstract to yield much in the way of
concrete results. I don't think judicial independence is a mere rhetorical
flourish. After all, I'm facing some uncomfortable results because of its
failure. But I do agree that one can't decide particular cases by reciting a
broad political maxim laid down two hundred years ago."
"As we said earlier, you have to get down to cases. Are you ready for
my next argument?"
"I'm waiting."
E. THE ROLE OF STRUCTURE
"Consider how structure plays a role in judging, both aspirationally
and as a limitation."
"I'm intrigued," I said. "I love structural arguments. Unlike ones
based on rhetoric or high-flown abstractions, they sometimes actually get
somewhere."
"I think you'll agree this one does," Rodrigo said. "Notice how
judges can't actually be independent. If they are, they'll get reversed.68
Even before that, if too independent, they won't get confirmed. 69 In this
age, that doesn't take much independence at all."
66. See supra notes 10, 15, 19, 47-52, and accompanying text; Dan Carney, Striking Contro-
versial Provisions, House Waters Down Bill Limiting Federal Judges' Powers, CQ WEEKLY, Apr. 25,
1998, at 1074-75. See also ROBERT BORK, SLOUCHiNG TowARD GOMORRAH 117 (1996) (criticizing
activist judges and urging amendment to allow Congressional override of federal court decisions with
which that body disagrees); ABA, supra note 9, at 44 (opposing this proposal).
67. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text; Camey, supra note 66, at 1074.
68. See Kairys, supra note 42.
69. See supra notes 11, 17-18, and accompanying text; infra notes 71-72. See generally
SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES (1997) (discussing the process of judicial selection).
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"I can certainly think of examples," I said. "One Supreme Court
nominee got thrown out because he smoked marijuana decades earlier.
70
And you know what happened to Lani Guinier71 and Bill Lann Lee. 2 Too
leftist for the Republicans in Congress, they saw Clinton abandon them or,
in Lee's case, beat a strategic retreat and name him only to an interim po-
sition."
"Real renegades don't even make it that far," Rodrigo went on. "It
turns out that the independence we tout means only a narrow thing: One
should be in no particular person's thrall, while leading an average life and
doing ordinary, bureaucratic 'normal science.'
' 73
"The demography of the federal bench, at least, bears you out," I con-
ceded.74 "I certainly wish they were more diverse. I wouldn't mind hav-
ing a minority judge this afternoon," I added wistfully.
"As we mentioned, the bench contains very few disabled people,
Marxists, labor organizers, minorities, or gay and lesbian people. Real in-
dependence would mean judges with a wide range of life experience. It
would mean upholding draft resisters, at least on occasion, affording a
sympathetic hearing to against-the-grain groups, and giving careful con-
sideration to Ruth Colker's antisubordination interpretation of Equal Pro-
tection jurisprudence."
75
"Is this your other kind of structural independence?" I asked.
"It shades into it," Rodrigo answered. "Do you remember when we
were discussing on another occasion the idea of structural due process?
7 6
"In connection with cloning and human procreative technologies?"
"Exactly," Rodrigo replied. "Proposed in modem times, at least, by
Laurence Tribe,77 but foreshadowed in Continental philosophy, structural
70. See Editorial, Behind the Ginsburg Smoke, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 10, 1987, at A34 (discussing
the rejection of Supreme Court nominee Douglas Ginsburg).
71. For a step-by-step account of her confirmation struggles written by the candidate herself,
see LANI GUINIER, LIFrEVERY VOICE (1998).
72. See Broder, supra note 16, at Al (discussing Mr. Lee's difficulties).
73. The term "normal science" was coined by Thomas Kuhn. See THOMAS S. KuHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). "Normal science" refers to inquiry conducted
within the reigning paradigm-safe, incrementalist, and familiar.
74. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
75. See Ruth Colker, Antisubordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1003 (1986).
76. See DELGADO, CHROMOSOMES, supra note 1.
77. See TRIBE, supra note 53, at 1673-87; Laurence Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975).
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due process means that in contentious cases falling in a zone of moral flux,
courts should afford the most complete, open hearing.78 Later, when soci-
ety has decided where it stands on an issue, say women's or gay rights,
they may afford more streamlined treatment under codified rules.79 Until
that time, we ought to give those cases the broadest scope, allowing every
point of view to be heard. Liberal rules of evidence, intervention, and bur-
dens of proof ought to be applied. At this early stage, we don't know
where we stand on the issue. We thus do ourselves a favor by forcing the
most open treatment. Later, when we know the geography of the area, we
can give litigants more cursory, standardized treatment.
80
"Not a bad idea," I said, "at least in theory."
"But my point is that this is exactly what we do not do," Rodrigo said.
"It would require a kind of meta-knowledge on the part of judges, some-
thing most lack as narrow specialists. Consider, for example, their disap-
pointingly wooden, mechanistic dismissal of hate speech cases brought
under campus speech codes."
81
"Or the cross-burning case," I interjected.82 "Scalia's opinion sounds
like a Gilbert's outline of 1950s free speech law. It gives scant attention to
the interests of the black family on whose lawn the cross was burned. The
same is true of the two district court decisions striking down campus
speech codes."
83
"Although those were cases presenting novel, emerging issues of
great social importance," I concluded, "the judges treated them as though
someone proposed a rule limiting bookshops to one hundred square feet.
Touting the independence of judges, when they now demonstrate so little
of it, is a little like praising the independence of notaries, car mechanics, or
accountants."
"Professor, you're more of a crit than you may realize. Independence
is a cry judges raise only when they are doing something that others ques-
tion. Most of their work is routinized, bureaucratized butchery. Cover
was right-they do operate against a field of pain and death." 84
78. See Tribe, supra note 77, at 283.
79. See id. at 290.
80. See id. at 314. See also DELGADO, CHROMOSOMES, supra note 1 (making similar proposal).
81. See, e.g., U.M.W. Post v. Regents of Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991);
Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F.Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). See also Richard Delgado, Campus
Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 343 (1991).
82. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 81.
84. See Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE. L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
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"Yet act blithely ignorant of that," I said. "Otherwise, they would
slow down when operating in the zone of moral flux, when doing some-
thing novel and socially important."
"Instead they seem to hurry up," Rodrigo said. "Or throw up their
hands and say, 'We can do no other. Our hands are tied. The mighty First
Amendment decrees .... '
"Sometimes, people and groups participate legitimately in constitu-
tional value-making," I commented.
"Robert Cover wrote about that, too," Rodrigo said. "Norms come
from many sources, including the work of small groups, even individuals.
We all participate in norm-making, in our daily lives, in what we do."
85
"And your point, I suppose, is that none of this is illegitimate or an af-
front to political principle."
"Not at all," Rodrigo said. "You have to look at what the pressure
group is doing. The Freemen, I think, are going too far when they declare
that the government is totally illegitimate and try to set up their own court
system.8 6 But patriot groups are perfectly within their rights to insist that
we have too much taxation, or that this or that judge exceeds his or her
mandate in requiring them to pledge allegiance in school or at the com-
mencement of a civic proceeding."
87
"You crits do make common cause with the strangest people," I said,
shaking my head. "What's your next argument?"
F. THE CASH VALUE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
"Historically, judicial independence simply has not been worth that
much," Rodrigo began. "In the hundred years between Dred Scott8 8 and
Brown v. Board of Education,89 very few judges exercised their independ-
ence to rule against Jim Crow or official segregation in schools, beaches,
85. See Robert Cover, Foreword: Nomos & Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11 (1983).
86. On this group of Montana-based radical libertarians, see Jon C. Blue, One Nation, Divisible,
with Libertyfor None, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1988, at A27.
87. Patriot groups and some in the religious right object to these requirements. See Marguerite
A. Driessen, Private Organizations and the Militia Status: They Don't Make Militias Like They Used
To, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1, 19 n.91. See also CRITICAL vHrrE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR
547-604 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1997) (discussing white supremacist movements).
88. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
89. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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and public facilities.90 They blandly did 'ordinary science,' which meant
ruling against integration."
"The same happened during other times of stress," I added. "Few
judges stood up against McCarthyism or the Salem witch trials,91 even
fewer against slavery.92 And everyone knows that the German judiciary
and bar meekly went along with the excesses of Nazism and the Holo-
caust.93 Cases like Buck v. Bell 94 and Dred Scott mar the careers of some
of our most eminent judges, who seem to have gone right along with the
spirit of the times.95 If they had independence, they chose not to exercise
it."
"A black or gay judge would not have handed down Plessy v. Fergu-
son96 or Bowers v. Hardwick,"97 Rodrigo said. "Or been less likely to," he
added.
"I can certainly think of a prominent one today who might," I added
mildly, not wanting to make too much of it.98
"Still, people make a big thing of the occasional case where a judge
stood up for principle ......
"Like Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,"99 I interjected.
"Right!" Rodrigo exclaimed. "Neglecting the hundred cases where
they uphold the unjust, brutal law. Or, in Harlan's case, upholding anti-
Asian laws.'00 His liberality toward blacks evidently did not generalize.
90. See, e.g., LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRE-
SUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1996). Cf. Delgado & Stefancic, Norms, supra note
25 (discussing weakness of judges in general).
91. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR. & L. BRENT BOZELL, MCCARTHY AND His ENEMIES
(1954); PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE DEVIL'S DISCIPLES: MAKERS OF THE SALEM WITCH TRIALS
154-78 (1996).
92. See LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROCESS: THE COLONIAL YEARS (1978).
93. See MICHAEL STOLLEIS, THE LAW UNDER THE SWASTIKA: STUDIES ON LEGAL HISTORY IN
NAZI GERMANY 2-3 (1998).
94. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
95. See Delgado & Stefancic, Norms, supra note 25, at 1929-31, 1934-52.
96. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
97. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
98. I was thinking of Justice Clarence Thomas, author of numerous opinions that have set back
the fortunes of minorities and the poor. For an analysis of Thomas' jurisprudence, see Stuart Taylor,
Jr., The Problem with Clarence Thomas, 19 LEG. TIMES, June 1996, at 21.
99. 163 U.S. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
100. See Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L.
REv. 151 (1996). Cf. Pat Chew, Asian Americans: The 'Reticent' Minority and Their Paradoxes, 36
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1984) (on law's neglect of the Asian minority).
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His Asian jurisprudence was just as jingoistic and racist as that of the rest
of the justices.' I was just reading an article on this."
"I think I saw it, too. It was by a young Asian scholar, if I recall, and
won some sort of prize."
"That's the one," Rodrigo said. "The Thurgood Marshall Prize, if I
remember correctly."102
"Right. But I hope you're not saying that Harlan's remarkably hu-
mane opinion was dimmed in some way by his failure to reach the highest
degree of sainthood when writing other ones?"
"No, not dimmed," Rodrigo said. "It does show, however, that we
need to beware of a certain celebratory tendency. Some judges' counter-
majoritarian rulings may not be as brave as we like to think. I'm sure you
know of Derrick Bell's analysis of Brown v. Board of Education as a ma-
joritarian exercise."103 When I nodded yes, Rodrigo continued, "And an-
other scholar speculated that Justice Harlan may have written as he did in
Plessy because he had a black brother.1°4 Not having an Asian brother, he
lapsed back into business as usual when the Chinese Exclusion cases came
before him."
"So you're saying that true judicial independence is rare, and often
explained on simple material terms."
"Rather than ideal ones," Rodrigo added. "Or may serve to promote
stasis, to assure that the gap between our ideals and current reality doesn't
become too great."
"Contradiction-closing cases, Bell calls them."'
10 5
"Which allow business as usual to go on even more smoothly than be-
fore, because now we can point to the exceptional case and say, 'See, our
system is really fair and just. See what we just did for minorities or the
poor.
"Overlooking that the rest of the time, we support a system that ex-
cludes them from jobs, schools, friendship networks, homes in the suburbs,
101. See Chin, supra note 100, at 157-66.
102. See id. at 151, n.*.
103. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Di-
lemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
104. See James Gordon, Did the First Justice Harlan Have a Black Brother?, 15 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 159 (1993), reprinted in CUrrING EDGE, supra note 3, at 122.
105. See Bell, Civil Rights Chronicles, supra note 11, at 32.
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
and many of the good things of life.1 6 But I still believe in judicial inde-
pendence. Judges aren't perfect, and Harlan or Holmes may have suffered
a black eye now and then. But I'd rather have a judiciary that can act
fearlessly at least every now and then than one that is constantly looking
over its shoulder at what the demagogues, letter-writers, newspaper editors
and right-wing fanatics are saying. In fact, in about," I looked at my
watch, "fifteen minutes, I hope my judge is willing to exercise a little in-
dependence. Otherwise this absurdly severe charge could actually stick,
and I might do time for jaywalking, if you can believe it."
"I have nothing against judicial courage," Rodrigo replied. "That's
always a good thing. It's just characterizing the virtue as judicial inde-
pendence that I think is misleading."
The waiter arrived to tell us that the desert line now contained their
specialty, carrot cake with pistachio frosting. We looked at each other.
Rodrigo seemed interested, so I said, "What the heck. If I'm going to jail,
I might as well have a good last meal." Rodrigo picked up his tray, and I
followed him to the line. After we returned to our tables, Rodrigo contin-
ued the conversation.
G. THE ORDINARY AND THE EXTRAORDINARY: THE EXAMPLE OF RACE
"On the subject of courage, consider courts' race jurisprudence. I
know you may feel differently in light of your own experience, but history
shows that judicial independence has not been of great help to minorities.
Courts sometimes hand down helpful opinions, to be sure. But some of the
worst-Plessy, Dred Scott, McClesky v. Kemp,10 7 Bowers v. Harwick108 -
came down when the Court was not under great pressure. And some of the
best decisions-Brown,10 9 Hernandez," and in Australia, Mabol I '-were
handed down when it was. Pressure can, of course, make courts rule even
more regressively than they ordinarily would: Consider how right-wing
pressure or Southern resistance brought about the Adarand 12 decision, the
106. See id.
107. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
108. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
109. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
110. Hemandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
11l. Mabo v. Queensland (1992) 175 C.L.R. I (upholding aborigines' land claims against doc-
trine of terra nullus-that at the time of settlers' arrival, Australian land was essentially unowned and
ripe for taking).
112. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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reversal of Metro Broadcasting,113 or Brown 11.114 Liberals who worry
about judicial independence seem to assume that without pressure, courts
will do the right thing. But unpressured, business-as-usual judging is the
real problem, not the pressured kind."
"You and I once discussed how systemic evils, like racism, that are
deeply imbedded in the fabric of society, are very hard to see and cor-
rect.115 We called it the empathic fallacy, if I recall.
116
"We did," Rodrigo said. "It consists of believing that we can easily
and quickly rid ourselves of error and injustice by merely naming and
calling attention to them. 17 Experience shows that this does not happen.
The voice of the reformer is simply not heard, or dismissed as incoherent
or absurd. 1 8 It's only when ten thousand voices are shouting in the streets
that we begin to pay attention."
"And that's what people call 'pressure,"' I said ironically.
"When a black judge gets a black case, this looks like bias, so that
white attorneys almost invariably call for the judge to recuse himself. In
one case, Leon Higginbotham decided to stick it out and remain on the
bench.1 19 A big furor ensued, with few riding to his rescue. With business
as usual-white judges hearing white cases-hardly anyone raises such a
stink. But the mere possibility that a black judge might give sympathetic
treatment to one of his race raises hackles. And the furor in Higgin-
botham's case-no one called that an affront to judicial independence,
which it was. The famous African-American judge's critics thought it
stood to reason that he should step down, and were upset when he re-
fused."
120
"And as we mentioned before, when black jurors decline to convict a
black defendant, law and order types are outraged and demand reforms so
113. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (upholding minority preference in
issuance of broadcast licenses).
114. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) ("Brown f'--implementation de-
cision, permitting desegregation to proceed at "all deliberate speed").
115. See Delgado, Empathy, supra note 1, at 68-74. On the related "reconstructive paradox," see
generally Delgado & Stefancic, Social Construction, supra note 54.
116. See Delgado, Empathy, supra note 1, at 69-73. See also Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic,
Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social
Ills?, 77 CoRNELL L. REV. 1258, 1281 (1992) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic, Images].
117. See Delgado & Stefancic, Images, supra note 116, at 1259-61, 1281.
118. See id.at 1281.
119. See ill, supra note 22, at 114-15 (discussing Higgenbotham's ordeal).
120. See id.
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that this cannot happen again. 12 1 No one speaks of jury independence,
even though the jury's role in our scheme of justice is as ancient and vital
as that of the judge."
"Judicial independence is really a misnomer. Our paradigm does not
allow for it. A high majority of cases brought by prosecutors result in
conviction. Few cases are overturned on appeal ......
"Unless they're from a maverick judge or liberal Circuit, like the
Ninth," I cracked.
122
"Right. The real aim of those seeking Constitutional amendments
allowing for congressional overturning of court judgments 123 is to con-
strain judges who display any sort of legal thought other than the norma-
tive or traditional. They want to make judges toe the line, act in predict-
able ways."
"But, wait a minute," I said. "Doesn't that cut the other way? If you
are a social reformer, would you not welcome judicial independence?
That way, judges would be free to act in nonnormative ways, as you call
them."
"In theory, yes," Rodrigo conceded. "While liberals and the ABA
rightly stand up for the concept of judicial independence, 124 they are not
defending it in any real sense, because judges have almost never acted in-
dependently. The entire structure of the legal system, from stare decisis to
judicial demography to judicial ethics and socialization, assures this."
"So, the whole thing is a legitimating myth?"
"Yes and no," Rodrigo answered. "It's better to have it than not. But
having these little side skirmishes from time to time, even if the right side
wins, sets us back. They enable us to pat ourselves on the back and relax,
overlooking the other ninety-nine out of a hundred cases when the judge
does the predictable thing."
"Given his or her background, ethnicity, social status, and role."
121. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Bloods and the Crits, NEW REPUBLIc, Dec. 9, 1996, at 27
(decrying O.J. Simpson's acquittal and laying blame on critical race theorists who devised notions of
law as storytelling). See also Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989) (discussing legal storytelling).
122. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
123. See BORK, supra note 66, at 117 (setting forth this proposal). But see Cuomo, supra note
15, at 300 (criticizing Judge Bork's proposal).
124. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
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"Exactly," Rodrigo said. "If the ABA report had addressed the way
the culture of law, for lack of a better word, determines the outcome of
particular cases, it would have reached a more disheartening conclusion."
"But, what's wrong with that?" I asked, beginning to be aware of a
looming shape that had approached our table.
"Hello, again," said Rodrigo, looking up at the figure who had mate-
rialized at our tableside. It was my lawyer.
"Hi," said Steinglass. Then, to me: "We're on, but not 'til two
o'clock. And, you'll be glad to know, the prosecutor wants to meet with
us fifteen minutes before. She may be ready to deal. Sanity may have re-
turned."
'That would be a relief," I said. Then after a pause: "Won't you join
us? You remember Rodrigo from this morning. He teaches at the public
school upstate and is in town for a committee meeting. In the chambers of
the chief judge, in fact."
"Welcome back," Rodrigo said shaking hands. "Congratulations on
that plea bargain."
"I won't start celebrating until it's signed and delivered," said my
lawyer. "Maybe I'll get a cup of coffee and join you in a minute."
H. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AS CIvILITY: A ONE-WAY STREET
While waiting for my lawyer to return, I turned to Rodrigo. "We may
not have very long. By my count, you've got one more argument left."
"Actually, your lawyer friend might have something to say on it. The
idea is that in one of its aspects, the call for judicial independence is hypo-
critical. Maybe that's too harsh-I should say one-sided."
"One sided?"
"I mean that one of the complaints the judicial independence crowd
makes is that harsh criticism, especially from lawyers, tarnishes the image
of the legal system, 125 detracting from the majesty and dignity of the
courts."
"Well, that of judges, anyway. They're not the courts. I mean, there
are other players as well, including the lawyers, the parties, the juries, the
reviewing court ......
125. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 17 (discussing but not subscribing to this view).
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"I know. The complaints are a little selective. But they are also one-
sided. Had you noticed how judges frequently feel free to belittle or ad-
monish a lawyer who is presenting a novel claim, or taking too long to pre-
sent an established one?"'
126
"Rule 11 cases present some notorious examples," I said.'27 "In fact,
I was reading an article just the other day entitled 'Scorn,' in which the
authors point out how freely some judges belittle, dismiss, or ridicule law-
yers who do something out of the ordinary, such as bring a novel case, say
for comparable worth."1
28
"I think I saw it, too," Rodrigo said. "If I'm not mistaken, the authors
argued that scorn and satire are never warranted out of the mouths of
judges."
"Sounds like you two have been having a good time." It was Stein-
glass, a smile on his face and a huge plastic cup of coffee in his hand.
"Have a seat," I said. "How much time have we got?"
When Steinglass said, "About thirty minutes, don't worry-I've set
my wrist alarm," I summarized our discussion, explaining Rodrigo's task
on the committee and his overall thesis that judicial independence serves
as a legitimating myth. I repeated, in summary form, Rodrigo's eight ob-
servations, including that judicial independence can serve as a deflection,
and that judges are a peculiar object of mercy. I reiterated his point that
the judicial-independence norm, like many, is a paired platitude and, as
such, perfectly indeterminate; and, as a further example of it, that one can
argue judicial independence either as an aspect of, or a danger to a system
of checks and balances. I mentioned his argument that real judicial inde-
pendence would lead to judges' applying some variant of structural due
process, but that they rarely do so. Rather, they afford cutting-edge cases
irritable, cursory treatment. Finally, I outlined Rodrigo's example of race
jurisprudence and what it showed about the low cash value of judicial re-
view and independence, and concluded with his argument that civility-
one component of the judicial-independence rallying cry-seldom cuts
both ways, as judges feel free to be as uncivil as they like, rebuking law-
yers and parties in scathing terms when they do something that raises their
126. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. See also Freedman, supra note 17, at 730;
Kaye, supra note 10, at 715-20.
127. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (c) (permitting courts to punish parties and attorneys who file frivo-
lous lawsuits).
128. See Delgado & Stefancic, Scorn, supra note 39.
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ire. "He ties it to a whole theory of humor," I said. "I know this from a
previous discussion."
When Steinglass looked interested, Rodrigo said, "Yes, satire and
scorn are never justified, except against the high and mighty, those who
abuse power and authority. 129 The powerful, such as judges, may never
rightly wield those tools against those of lesser power and station. One
root of humor is humus, bringing low, down to earth. 130 The classic sati-
rists, like Swift, Voltarie, and Mark Twain, realized this, reserving their
barbs and slings for the pompous and self-important. They never made fun
at the expense of the lowly, such as beggers or the blind."'
131
"So, you're saying that judges can dish it out, but can't take it," Ste-
inglass said. Rodrigo gave a "something like that" nod, so the lawyer went
on: "I've certainly seen cases like that, including one I argued just last
week, a DUI. The judge was as sarcastic as a human being can be, merely
because my client, a physician who was on medication, refused to take a
breathalyzer test."
"Judges like to affect false modesty," Rodrigo interjected. "We're the
least powerful branch. 132 We defer to political questions. 133 In diversity
cases, we are oh-so-careful not to overstep on state sovereignty. 134 We are
bound by precedent. All we do is read and apply the statute. But try at-
tacking or criticizing a judge, and the iron fist comes out of the velvet
glove. The false modesty disappears. You can get thrown in jail for con-
tempt or condemned by your bar association for unseemly expression."
"Thanks for the summary," Steinglass said. Then, looking over at
me: "I gather that you, Professor, have your doubts about what this young
fellow is saying. I do, too. If you'd like to hear what a practicing lawyer
thinks ......
When Rodrigo and I both nodded eagerly, he continued, "I actually
taught trial practice at the Professor's school for several years. So, al-
though I'm not as well-versed in critical thought as you are, Rodrigo, I've
read a little in political theory and the new clinical jurisprudence. And if
you'll allow me, I'd like to make a case for judicial independence that goes
beyond the liberal pieties you usually hear."
129. See id. at 1062-63.
130. See id. at 1063.
131. See id. at 1063-65.
132. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
133. See TRIBE, supra note 53, §3-13, at 96-107.
134. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that federal courts are required
to apply state substantive law in diversity of citizenship cases).
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"Please do," we said in unison. Taking a deep draught of his coffee
and a quick glance at his watch, Steinglass began.
CONCLUSION: STEINGLASS MAKES THE CASE FOR
AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY AND AN INDEPENDENT BAR, AND
WE CONCLUDE ON A NOTE OF RECONCILIATION
"Do you two know about the host of books that have come out re-
cently on the role of the professions in Nazi Germany and the Third
Reich?" We both nodded a little uncertainly, so Steinglass continued.
"Books by Robert Jay Lifton, 135 George Annas,
136 and Michael Stolleis 137
highlight how Nazi doctors and the German bench and bar did little to stop
the atrocities that were occurring with increasing frequency in the years
leading up to World War II."
"I've read some of them," Rodrigo said. "I've even heard it theorized
that concern over the excesses of statism in Germany underlay the Su-
preme Court's decision in Hickman v. Taylor,138 the work-product privi-
lege case."
When Steinglass looked a little uncertain, I chimed in, "I've heard
that, too. The idea is that Justice Jackson and at least one of the court
clerks who participated in that landmark 1946 decision had just returned
from taking part in the trials at Nuremberg of Nazi war criminals. One of
the impressions they brought back with them was the craven behavior of
the German bar and judiciary, which, unlike ours, follow a nonadversarial,
or inquiry-based, model in which the lawyers and judge cooperate in trying
to reach the truth. Unlike here, where the lawyers are the zealous advo-
cates of their clients' cause and try to vanquish the other side, German
lawyers, at least in that period, considered themselves arms of government
and allies of each other and of the judges."'
139
"Oh, now I see the connection," Steinglass said, his face lighting up.
"And it illustrates my point perfectly. Without a work-product privilege in
our recently adopted rules of civil discovery, lawyers would be able to pry
secrets out of each other. Mental impressions, legal theories, and office
135. See ROBERT JAY LIFrON, THE NAZI DOCTORS: MEDICAL KILLING AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
GENOCIDE (1986).
136. See THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EX-
PERIMENTATION (George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992).
137. See STOLLEIS, supra note 93.
138. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
139. Arthur Miller first pointed out this connection to me.
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memoranda would be required to be shared with the other side.140 That
degree of cooperation would be suffocating, would start us on the road to
groupthink, and would be incompatible with the sort of feisty, combative
adversarial system we now have. With all its bumps, warts, and ineffi-
ciencies, it's still the best system in the world. Certainly it's the best guar-
antor against statism and Big Brother yet invented. And that's why judges
must be independent."
We both started as Steinglass' wristwatch alarm went off suddenly.
"I have it set loud," he explained. "I have to be able to hear it even in a
noisy corridor. We've got a few more minutes."
All three of us were silent for a moment. Then Rodrigo said: "A
powerful example. And I agree that judicial independence can serve as a
vital bulwark against excesses of statism and atrocities like those we saw
in Germany. Even though once or twice in our history, it didn't work as
intended. For I think I see a way of reconciling my own critique and Mr.
Steinglass' insight. Do we have a minute to sort of pull things together?"
"I'd be most interested," I said, looking over at my lawyer, who nod-
ded.
"It just occurred to me that judicial independence has a double as-
pect," Rodrigo began.
"Both advancing and retarding the search for basic justice?" I said,
hearkening back to something we had said earlier.
141
"Yes. It's one of those mechanisms whose value is hard to pin down
because it is capable of doing great good in individual cases, while the op-
posite in the large run of them."
"Hmm," I said. "That makes sense of cases like mine, where one
might well wish for the judge to be able to work free from outside pres-
sure. But insisting that the judiciary be always and forever insulated from
criticism can paralyze political instincts, and allow atrocities. Criticism-
at least of the kind directed upward, toward authority-is the best guaran-
tor of liberty."
"I'll buy that," Steinglass said. "Even though I'm up for a judicial
appointment myself, the idea of rules against criticizing judges strikes me
as a dangerous precedent."
140. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 509.
141. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (discussing how liberal legalisms simultane-
ously advance and retard the search for social justice).
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"As for myself," I said, sensing that we were about to conclude, "I
like your idea of judicial courage, Rodrigo. Maybe the best guarantor of
liberty is to pick judges who believe in something and then train them to
stand their ground when unfair criticism comes their way."
Just then, a slender, uniformed young man approached our table.
"Mister Steinglass, Professor. Excuse me. The court is now in session.
But the District Attorney decided to accept your plea bargain. Ten hours
of community service, plus the biker's medicals. You can all go home.
Just mail these papers in. Just among the three of us, the judge thought the
whole thing pretty silly. In fact, his precise words were, 'I'll be glad to
take the heat on this one.'
